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Summary:  
This paper explores organizational dynamics that go with the design and implementation of public 
administration reforms within the UN system. It focuses on management reforms carried out in the 
UNAIDS Programme, which brings together ten UN agencies to combat the worldwide HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. The paper suggests that understanding these reforms requires questioning the exposure of 
UN administrations to pressures emanating from their environment and, at the same time, 
investigating the intentions of bureaucratic entrepreneurs who promote and drive reforms within the 
UN system. The empirical development demonstrates that the swift incorporation of the external 
pressure into a reform process in the mid-2000s cannot be dissociated from the active support of some 
UN agencies who have had a common interest in shifting institutional arrangements inside UNAIDS to 
expand their bureaucratic authority. In conclusion, the paper suggests analyzing reforms within 
international administrations as social processes driven by both coercion and opportunities. 
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Over the last six decades, administration reform has continuously been presented as a central 
challenge for the UN system. In 1969, the Jackson report already viewed the 
bureaucratization and the proliferation of intergovernmental bodies as major challenges that 
might undermine the main missions of the UN system. Since the 1970s, each Secretary-
General was elected with the task of reforming the UN bureaucracy to simplify the 
institutional architecture, reduce transaction costs among organizations, strengthen 
accountability and transparency, avoid duplication of programmes, and improve the capacity 
to react swiftly to emerging policy issues (Krasno, 2004). The pressure to reform have 
significantly increased during the 2000s, as critical views on the multilateral system continue 
to argue that international organizations are still facing convergent governance challenges, 
such as a high degree of institutional complexity, coordination problems, lack of visibility and 
predictability, and potentially overlapping, competing, and even conflicting agendas. In this 
context, all UN agencies have included administrative reform as a key objective on their 
programmes and increased the resources dedicated to bureaucratic change. This article 
concentrates on public administration reforms within UN organizations involved in the 
multilateral response to AIDS, which offers valuable insights into broader UN reform3. It 
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3 The content of this paper does not represent the views of any organization to which the author has been 
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provides an empirical analysis of the reform of Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS – better 
known as UNAIDS – which brings several UN agencies and a Secretariat together. It focuses 
on the efforts that have been made to improve the governance of UNAIDS, as well as the 
various obstacles that may prevent to achieve its objectives. It concentrates on “management 
reforms,” defined as the various intentional actions taken by governing bodies, on one or 
several occasions, to change the formal rules, procedures and mechanisms of the 
organizations over which they have authority. These reforms aim at influencing decision-
making and regulation processes regarding power distribution, resource allocation, human 
resources, and policy-making4. 
This article explores organizational dynamics that go with the design and implementation of 
public administration reforms in a UN Programme constituting a multi-organizational system. 
It pays particular attention to various factors that may explain why public organizations enter 
into a process of management reform in a certain time and in a specific configuration. It 
questions the exposure of international bureaucracies to external pressures and, at the same 
time, investigates the intentions of actors involved in the decision-making processes leading to 
reform. Therefore it argues that one might not dissociate approaches concentrating on 
interactions between public organizations and their environment on the one hand, and 
analytical accounts that focus on administrations and their sub-units as collective actors who 
are concerned with the realization of specific goals on the other hand. This article also 
suggests that one might examine both institutional pressure and strategic games, considered as 
intertwined factors that may open the way to reform in international organizations. 
The paper is divided into four parts. Part 1 draws some theoretical perspectives on public 
administration reforms within international organizations. Part 2 explores some intention-
based and institutional factors that explain why management reforms within UNAIDS could 
not have come from UN agencies themselves, although they have been assigned to drive 
bureaucratic change towards an integrated Programme. Part 3 analyses the increasing 
responsiveness of UN agencies to external pressure in the early 2000s, which contributed to 
place the governance reform on the UNAIDS agenda. Part 4 analyzes transactional games 
between UNAIDS members, which led to a new configuration of actors who supported the 
elaboration and the implementation of reform objectives into the UNAIDS Programme.  
Administration reforms in international organizations: a conceptual 
framework 
This paper suggests that understanding the management reforms initiated within a UN 
Programme such as UNAIDS requires investigating both the factors that lead public 
organizations to adopt new standard rules and operating procedures in order to respond to the 
pressure coming from their environment, and the factors associated with the intentions and 
                                                                                                                                                   
“observer” to several UNAIDS governing boards. For reasons associated with confidentiality obligations, the 
author does not quote or mention individuals. This confidentiality does not mean that the role of individual 
actors should be underestimated in bureaucratic processes within UNAIDS.  
4 Therefore, this paper does not concentrate on “institutional reforms,” which not only relate to decision-making 
and regulation within organizations, but also look for an extensive, multi-layered reorganization of bureaucratic 
structures. Both management and institutional reforms are intended to change governance mechanisms, but this 
is a merely theoretical distinction: empirically, some management reforms may be so extensive as to result in 
institutional reform. 
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activities of “public entrepreneurs” who promote and drive reform processes within these 
bureaucracies5. 
The three dimensions of international administrations’ exposure to external pressure 
A wide literature on bureaucratic organizations demonstrates that public administrations are 
not self-referential organizations. Some perspectives pay attention to the processes by which 
organizations tend to import policy options, administrative solutions, norms, beliefs, and 
patterns of behavior that are predominant in other organizations, policy sectors, and countries. 
Other approaches focus on transversal relations based on cooperation and conflict bringing 
bureaucratic agents together with political authorities, policy partners, various stakeholders 
and opinion makers. Such approaches constitute reasonable evidence that bureaucracies have 
an interest in their own reproduction and, therefore, are keen to respond to external inputs in 
order to shore up support and consolidate legitimacy. They examine the extent to which 
bureaucratic organizations depend on and react to external pressure. Not only do they 
concentrate on processes by which administrative reforms within organizations are shaped or 
even driven by external demands, they also pay attention to the capacity of bureaucratic 
organizations to select, reinvent and locally adapt standardized solutions (Eymeri-Douzans, 
2011; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Knill, 2001), to accommodate their formal structures 
without changing their internal practices (March and Olsen, 1989; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), 
or even to resist to external pressure.  
The exposure of administrations to external pressure can be associated with legal-institutional, 
cultural or material variables. Each variable is referring to a certain type of relation of 
dependency from the administration to its environment: legality, legitimacy, and interest. 
Tab. 1 The exposure of administrations to external pressure 
Variable Legal-institutional Cultural Material 
Relation of 
dependency 
Legality Legitimacy Interest 
Vehicle of 
the external 
pressure 
Legal regulations 
Routines, patterns of 
behavior and standard 
operating procedures  
Material resources 
(e.g. budget, technical 
support, personnel) 
Activity 
Activities associated 
with formal and 
binding procedures  
Activities associated 
with ordinary 
working practices in 
bureaucracy and 
professions  
Transactional 
games associated 
with policy-
decision making 
On the legal-institutional dimension, the dependency is based on legal regulations associated 
with the formal structure of the bureaucratic system. As international bureaucracies are 
organizations driven by governing boards composed of member states, they are subject to 
binding resolutions that are to be implemented through a large range of formal organizational 
mechanisms and procedures. Such a perspective leads to understand bureaucratic life by 
investigating the interactions between the administration’s units – considered as “agents” – 
and the member states that delegate power to the administration – considered as “principals”. 
By exploring such interactions, the principal/agent approach can provide some valuable 
insights into a better understanding of the legal-institutional relation of dependency.   
                                                
5 Public entrepreneurs may be defined as all individual or collective actors who mobilize resources and develop 
strategies to build, disseminate and/or implement innovative solutions within organizations of the public sector 
(Schneider and al. 1995). 
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The cultural dimension has been extensively explored by neoinstitutionalist studies on 
organizations. These studies lay the emphasis on the tendency of public organizations to 
import the norms, beliefs and institutional standards that are prevalent in their environment – 
a process known as “institutional isomorphism”. They argue that organizations are embedded 
in interorganizational systems and therefore are concerned about their external legitimacy; 
consequently they are keen to institutionalize routines, rules, patterns of behavior and 
standard procedures that are well in fashion in their environment and/or supposed to be 
efficient (Powell and DiMaggio 1983; Meyer and Scott 1992; Scott and Christensen 1995). 
Neoinstitutionalist studies usually focus on symbolic elements that relate to shared 
representations, ideological frames, and ‘policy narratives’. They provide valuable accounts 
that help to understand how administrative reforms may be shaped by the success of a 
normative vision (e.g., new public management precepts), by policy ideas disseminated by 
other actors6 (e.g., scientific knowledge promoted by epistemic communities, or moral ideas 
supported by advocacy coalitions), and by long-term change in the underlying representations 
and belief systems (e.g., global norms such as human rights or gender conceptions). 
As regards material aspects, administrations are dependent on various resources that are 
necessary to implement their activities and possibly to expand their influence. At the 
international level, they are highly reliant on funds provided by donor organizations, 
particularly in a time when extrabudgetary funding become key resources to supplement 
regular budgets. Most international organizations are dependant on governmental 
organizations representing OECD states (aid agencies and ministries), but an increasing 
number also rely on non-state financial partners from the charities or the private sector, which 
contribute to the financing of international programmes in many policy areas. The material 
dependency does not only refer to financial needs of administrations, but also to technical 
support and seconded staff provided by various state and non-state actors, which are key 
partners for international organization as they implement policies. 
Empirically, the exposure of public organizations to their environment leads to a wide variety 
of bureaucratic situations and may yield divergent organizational responses. Firstly, there are 
different types of external pressure on public organizations. The pressure from the 
environment may result from direct claims and demands from a wide range of actors 
(e.g., political authorities, policy partners, rival organizations, interest groups, activist 
networks). It may result from indirect incentives that are carried by policy broker and 
knowledge organizations (e.g., groups of experts, think tanks, epistemic communities, 
consulting firms). In such situations, it may be identified through specific interactions 
between bureaucrats and actors who work in contact with the administration. By contrast, the 
pressure may be the effect of a diffuse influence coming from cultural norms and 
representations, and may lead to incremental and elusive change in the organization. 
Secondly, the degree of exposure varies from organization to organization, depending on 
various factors, such as the strength of the bureaucratic culture within the organization, the 
legitimacy of the administration due to past activities, the capacity of administrative units to 
build sustainable linkages with policy partners (e.g. interest groups, NGOs, the medias), the 
financial capacity of the organization, the control of expert knowledge, or the characteristics 
of the policy sector within which the organization is involved (e.g. organizations acting in 
technical sectors, such as housing or transport, are usually less exposed than organizations in 
highly politicized areas, such as migrations). Thirdly, depending on such factors, the external 
pressure on bureaucracies may lead to a wide spectrum of organizational and policy 
responses, from institutional compliance to autonomous activities (Barnett and Finnemore 
                                                
6 The circulation of policy ideas that might have nurtured UNAIDS during the first decade of the Joint 
Programme is discussed elsewhere (Nay 2010). 
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2004). For instance, in a study on the European Commission, C. Boswell (2008), identifies 
four ideal-typical responses from public administrations to signals coming from their 
environment: full adaptation, reinterpretation, institutional decoupling, and evasion.  
Public administration reform and interest 
The analysis of the exposure of bureaucracies to their environment may help understand why 
they embark on a process of reform. It may help demonstrate that reforming policies 
regarding bureaucratic norms, rules and mechanisms are connected to incentives from other 
institutional actors, and are reflecting external shifts in the regulatory and normative patterns 
in the environment. Nevertheless, this article argues that these approaches should be 
complemented by and articulated to an analysis of the interests, intentions and strategies of 
actors who contribute to channel external pressure into appropriate functional responses 
within the organization. In this perspective, an analysis of reforms within international 
organizations should also capitalize on studies that focus on the various actors who compose 
the bureaucratic system itself. Such studies usually consider each administration as a system 
of actors driven by interests and goals, consolidated by shared norms and beliefs, rather than a 
single, homogenous organization. They show that social activities within bureaucracies may 
sometimes lead to organizational change. Most of the time, these studies focus on the 
interplay between specific sub-units within organizations7, which contribute to the adaptation 
of rules and the setting up of new policy-oriented instruments. They draw attention to the 
individuals, groups and units that drive change, or resistance to change. They may highlight 
internal competition for power, resource, and prestige (Pfeffer 1978), principal/agent relations 
(Vaubel 2006; Vaubel and al. 2007), policy entrepreneurs (McCown 2005; Roberts and King 
1991; Weissert 1991), leadership (Baumann and al., 2007), the activity of veto players 
(Tsebelis and Kreppel 1998), and even the role of bureaucratic culture and professional 
socialization in the shaping of staff behavior (Cini 1996).  
Choosing one perspective and excluding the other would mean maintaining a “blind spot” in 
the explanation. As Bauer and Knill (2007, 20) argue, analyzing management reforms within 
public organizations calls for an investigation of the interrelations between external and 
internal factors. On the one hand, decisions leading to bureaucratic reforms depend to a large 
extent on transversal activities that connect administrations to the various actors, policy 
networks and institutions in their environment. They are often imposed or encouraged, and 
sometimes immediately affected, by signals, direct incentives and structural transformations 
in the global environment. On the other hand, such reforms also result from the intentions and 
strategies of units or groups who participate in decision-making within organizations. They 
may even influence partners’ behavior and policy rules in the immediate environment of the 
organization.  
This article tackle a primary question regarding reform activities within UNAIDS: why has 
the Programme experienced a shift in management rules in 2005-2006, through the 
introduction of new standards procedures regarding budgets and finance, policy development, 
and coordination. This paper argues that the choice of UNAIDS members to embark on an 
extensive reform process is both a response to incentives coming from their environment, and 
the result of entrepreneurial strategies for change. At the empirical level, it suggests that 
UNAIDS reforms cannot be dissociated from structural change in global AIDS governance, 
from coercive pressures emanating from influent actors operating in the environment of the 
UN bureaucracy, and from strategies carried out by some segments of the UN Programme.  
                                                
7 For instance, in UN bureaucracies, this can include secretariats, departments, governing bodies, top-level 
bureaucrats, diplomats, unions, oversight committees, and evaluation teams. 
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Impediments to cooperation in a fragmented inter-organizational 
system 
While being originally conceived as a “groundbreaking” system aiming at experimenting 
innovative management and interagency coordination within the UN system, UNAIDS 
revealed very low capacity to insufflate change in the management and policy-making of the 
multilateral response to the epidemic until the mid-2000s. This part identify some factors that 
may explain the impediments to change in the UNAIDS Programme. 
 The experimentation of interagency coordination in the UN system  
When created in 1994 by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), UNAIDS was 
conceived an innovative institutional mechanism aiming at strengthening the commitment of 
UN organizations to respond to HIV and AIDS, one of the most critical challenges for 
development. The Programme brings together the efforts and resources of ten UN 
organizations involved in the response to the epidemic8: the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food 
Programme (WFP), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Population Fund 
(UNFPA), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Labour 
Organization (ILO); the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Bank. These ten international 
organizations have the status of “Cosponsoring organizations,” better known as 
“Cosponsors.” From the outset, UNAIDS was viewed as a cutting-edge system, with the 
objective to establish new governance mechanisms in the UN system at global level. First, it 
had been given the task of improving UN governance by strengthening interagency 
collaboration. Second, UNAIDS was the first UN Programme to introduce the formal 
representation of civil society on its governing board, with consultative status.  
Within UNAIDS the Cosponsors operate under the authority of a governing board9. They are 
assisted by a Secretariat, which is mandated to raise funds targeting HIV/AIDS and to 
distribute them among the Cosponsors. It also assists the Cosponsors in various ways. 
Moreover, it is expected to provide strategic information about the epidemic, mobilize 
technical resources, and engage with governments and civil society. It is to a large extent a 
“secretariat of UN secretariats”.  
In 1994, the ECOSOC assigned UNAIDS a very ambitious role in the long run, as the Joint 
UN Programme was officially established to build global consensus on policy responses to 
AIDS. Through UNAIDS, governments from the North and South, the UN system, and 
international partners from civil society were asked to agree on a global framework to combat 
a scourge that was jeopardizing years of effort in development, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, in contrast to other UN programmes whose main objective is to coordinate 
the efforts of state actors, the creation of UNAIDS was first and foremost a response to 
internal UN organizational challenges. Through UNAIDS, the Cosponsors were given the 
mandate of developing a multi-sectoral and integrated response to AIDS, by harmonizing 
their goals and objectives, constructing common policy tools, sharing knowledge and 
technical expertise, speaking “with one voice,” and, finally, jointly delivering at country level. 
                                                
8 At the outset, UNAIDS brought together six UN organizations (in fact one member, the World Bank, is a 
Bretton Woods system organization). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, four new UN entities joined the 
“UNAIDS family” (ILO, UNODC, WFP, UNHCR). 
9 The board is called the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB). It comprises 22 member states, the ten 
Cosponsors and five organizations representing the civil society. Only member states have the right to vote.  
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Interagency cooperation was expected to bring about a swift, reactive, and large-scale 
commitment by the UN to affected countries.  
From a broader perspective, as an interorganizational mechanism UNAIDS is expected to 
ensure the convergence – and, wherever possible, a close match – of policy goals in the areas 
of HIV prevention, impact mitigation, and access to antiretroviral treatment. It is also 
mandated to facilitate the elaboration of common management standards and work 
agreements in the various policy sectors associated with the response to AIDS. A system such 
as UNAIDS challenges the Cosponsors to combine their activities, even though they are 
complex organizational systems driven by different mandates, particular policy agendas, 
specific knowledge and norms, distinct technical expertise, and, last but not least, internal 
management procedures and routines. It also aims to reduce competition in fund-raising and 
fragmentation in decision-making, as well as overlap and duplication of effort in the provision 
of technical assistance to developing countries. 
At first sight, the functioning of the UNAIDS system provides a noteworthy example of the 
restructuring efforts that have been tried out to better coordinate the many UN agencies and 
programmes dedicated to development and poverty alleviation. To a great extent, when it was 
started in 1996 UNAIDS was a forerunner of the current UN system-wide reform policy. It 
was the first UN Programme dedicated to building a multi-dimensional response combining 
the efforts of various agencies.  
The resistance of UN bureaucracies to inter-organizational cooperation  
Despite being a good example of the institutional reforms the UN system has sought to set in 
motion in recent years, UNAIDS demonstrated very little progress in interagency cooperation 
during the first decade of the Programme. The large number of obstacles that impeded 
progress toward a unified UN response to AIDS offered significant illustrations of the 
challenges that go with reform activity in the UN system.  
UNAIDS faced not only limitations in financial and human capacity, but also discrepancies 
between Cosponsors’ key policy priorities and objectives. In the first years of the Programme, 
the absence of standard rules and mechanisms for interagency coordination, the low level of 
funding devoted to AIDS in most agencies’ programmes (except for WHO), and even the 
mistrust between top-level management teams (for example between WHO and the 
Secretariat), made the partnership less than consistent with the ambitious objectives set in 
1996. The policy dialogue between organizations led to cautious resolutions, most of which 
could hardly satisfy civil society organizations and networks of people living with HIV and 
AIDS, whose expectations of UNAIDS were very high at the start of the Programme. 
In the late nineties, there was very little chance that a change in UNAIDS governance would 
be initiated by the Cosponsors themselves. As an inter-organizational system, UNAIDS 
remained fragmented and poorly managed, as very low resources were dedicated to establish 
technical partnerships among Cosponsors and to build joint policy-guidance on AIDS. One 
common criticism, often raised by organizations representing the civil society, asserted that 
the low progress was resulting from three major factors: a lack of interest from the 
governments of the North, a political denial and/or a lack of political leadership in countries 
of the South, and a lack of commitment of international organizations due to their inefficient 
internal procedures. Connecting the lack of action to a lack of will, this criticism focuses on 
global actors and their intentions. Nevertheless the following development argues that these 
three intention-based arguments should be balanced with an analysis of organizational 
characteristics of UNAIDS, which may explain little progress in reforming institutional 
practices during the first decade of the Programme. 
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First, the low integration of the Programme may have resulted from a lack of financial 
incentives to persuade Cosponsors to effectively engage in interagency partnerships. The 
donors from OECD countries kept the UNAIDS budget at a level that could not meet the 
basic requirements for a scaled-up response. In 2002-2003, this budget reached only 
US$ 190 million, which was far from matching the level of epidemiological threat10. 
Moreover, during the first years of the Joint Programme, the absence of “interagency funds” 
(funding inducements dedicated to joint activities) meant that collaboration at a technical 
level was highly unlikely. Although UN policy-makers publicly disapproved of bureaucratic 
divisions and compartmentalization as a hindrance to a joint response to the epidemic, none of 
them had an interest in loosing part of their autonomy and influence by being involved in an 
integrated inter-organizational system, which might increase the risk of cross-checks and 
mutual surveillance regarding financial expenses, policy objectives, implementation 
effectiveness, and ethical issues. Each Cosponsor could expect to lose margins of autonomy 
within a new coordination system.  
Second, the lack of authority of the UNAIDS Secretariat is an important factor of poor 
management and coordination of the Programme in the first decade of exercize. The 
secretariat was created as an interagency coordination body, in charge of providing technical 
support to Cosponsors. Nevertherless it was not delegated from the ECOSOC with a wide 
mandate that would allow it to exert authority on Cosponsors. With poor finance, no biding 
procedure, and low expert capacity, it mainly acted as a facilitating body whom only capacity 
was to support Cosponsors’ AIDS programmes rather than insufflate new governance 
mechanisms. In this context, the Secretariat’s capacity to give impetus to interagency 
partnerships among Cosponsors, to elaborate joint management rules, to match Cosponsors’ 
programmes, or to flag new policy issues on HIV/AIDS remained low. The Secretariat was 
confined to collecting information on the Cosponsors’ scattered activities and helping 
formalize resolutions and policy guidelines, presented after the fact as a “Joint UN 
Programme”.  
Third, UNAIDS remained a conglomerate of international organizations rather than an 
integrated system because of inefficient and incomplete institutional mechanisms. Three 
characteristics of the institutional “architecture” of the Programme highly contributed to 
protect the autonomy of Cosponsors against pressures from the UNAIDS governing board, 
and therefore led to a fragmented inter-organizational system. The first characteristic relates 
to decision-making procedures. These procedures set consensus as a basis for all decisions 
within the Programme. Not only consensus is the rule for resolutions adopted by the 
governing board of UNAIDS, but it is also the decision rule within the steering committee 
bringing the Cosponsors’ executive directors together twice a year (the Committee of 
Cosponsoring Organizations). As AIDS has always been a very controversial policy issue 
among governments, the consensus-based decision-making mechanisms led to low-profile 
resolutions of the governing board with few recommendations to harmonize Cosponsors’ 
policy priorities and to set common management tools. The rule of consensus also preserved 
Cosponsors’ executive directors, in their steering committee, to make any decision towards 
organizational unity that would force other agencies to renounce to their autonomy, especially 
the most influent ones (such as WHO or the World Bank) that have no direct interest in 
loosing margins of control by participating in an interagency system. Moreover, despite 
having been created to ensure a coordination between the Cosponsors before and after each 
                                                
10 The UNAIDS budget reached US$ 484.8 million for 2008-2009 and is kept flat for 2010-2011 of which US$ 182 million is 
pledged for the functioning of the Secretariat and US$ 136 million for inter-institutional activities (some of which may be 
used by the Secretariat). The remaining funds are secured to support activities of the Cosponsors (US$ 161 million) and 
emergencies (US$ 5 million). 74 percent of the UBW targets country- and regional-level activities, while 26 percent is 
dedicated to global activities. 
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governing board, the steering committee acted as a filtering body between the UNAIDS board 
and the Cosponsors, protecting the UN bureaucracy from direct intrusions from UNAIDS 
member states. 
The second characteristic relates to mechanisms of endorsement involving UNAIDS member 
states and Cosponsors. The member states adopt resolutions at the UNAIDS governing board. 
These resolutions are binding decisions, but to be effective they have to be legally endorsed 
by the governing boards of each Cosponsors so as to be incorporated into their regular 
programmes. Such a system, requiring a “two-step endorsement” by two distinct governing 
bodies, reduces the UNAIDS board’s authority, which does not have the full resources to 
compel Cosponsors’ top-level managers to systematically connect their AIDS strategies and 
their micro-management to the rest of the UNAIDS family. It gives too much power to the 
“gate-keepers” who control the exchanges between UNAIDS and each UN agency. It 
increases the number of bureaucrats horizontally involved in the decision processes leading to 
the implementation of each UNAIDS resolution.  
A third characteristic of the institutional architecture of UNAIDS has been its low exposure to 
pressures and controls from the civil society organizations. In the global AIDS governance, 
civil society organizations have targeted the UN system to prompt governments to engage in 
massive AIDS responses at national level. They raised strong criticisms against the tendency 
of UN agencies to develop bureaucratic and scattered responses to AIDS problems. 
Nevertheless, their representatives have never had much influence on the development of the 
Programme despite being full members of the UNAIDS board. They take the floor on behalf 
of the populations who are affected, at risk, or vulnerable. But not only do they not have the 
right to vote, they do not weigh heavily in the deliberation processes. Moreover, despite 
interacting on a regular basis with the Secretariat and developing technical partnerships with 
the Cosponsors on specific policy issues, civil society organizations do not have any 
permanent forum – except the annual governing board – to ensure collective discussions with 
all UNAIDS members at the global level.  
In this context, one could hardly expect that UNAIDS governance reform would be initiated 
by its internal bodies, whether they are in the position of principals or agents. The following 
part argues rather that the management reform of UNAIDS has been resulting from external 
pressure on the UN Programme. It investigates institutional change in the environment of 
UNAIDS and the processes by which such change has contributed to make reform a priority 
on the agenda of all Cosponsors. 
The responsiveness of UN institutions to external pressure to reform 
This part focuses on two interrelated sets of external factors that have spurred UNAIDS to 
embark on a process of management reform: the structural change in global AIDS 
governance, and the pressure emanating from the donors to engage the UN into system-wide 
reform in a context of diffusion of new public management (NPM) standards.  
Global shifts in the AIDS governance and pressure to change 
In a globalized world, global AIDS responses illustrate how an international regime has 
become a pluralistic and complex governance system in less than 15 years. In the early 
nineties, AIDS policies were initiated by very few UN organizations, with the support of a 
limited number of donors. Twenty year after, the global AIDS governance is characterized by 
a complex architecture composed of multilevel institutions and embedded arenas, and 
involving a whole range of actors with different statuses and roles, such as innovative 
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financial mechanisms, bilateral agencies, financial institutions, foundations, pharmaceutical 
companies, field-based and international NGOs working in the health and social sectors, 
activist groups and networks of people living with HIV, community-based and faith-based 
organizations. These actors represent various constituencies. They are both allies and 
competitors in public-private partnerships, calling for international funding, building expertise 
and knowledge, and providing assistance to developing countries and vulnerable populations.  
In this polyarchic world, UN actors are no longer spearheading organizations. Most 
Cosponsors operate as “development partners” in multi-actor policy networks. They still 
fulfill the mandate to disseminate global policy guidance and provide technical assistance, but 
they have neither the resources nor the legitimacy to act as leading organizations in their 
policy sectors. Their individual visibility is lower, especially at country level where bilateral 
organizations and financial partners are more influential in policy-making mechanisms. Their 
singularity as drivers of development policies is increasingly challenged by non state actors, 
which are developing parallel activities in the same policy areas. In some countries, they are 
likely to be sidelined by host governments who may choose to work with other development 
partners to build and implement their national AIDS strategy, including bilateral agencies, 
NGOs, charities and private companies. At the global level, the creation of a multilateral fund 
disconnected from the UN system in 2001 – the Global fund to fight AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis – constituted a major signal for all UNAIDS partners as the UN system was not 
considered as an appropriate vehicle to channel multilateral funding sources to countries. In 
the new governance of AIDS, the UN’s leading role can no longer be taken for granted.  
These transformations are not specific to the AIDS governance. They characterize most 
sectors of development. In the new global aid architecture, UN organizations are more 
exposed to their environment, as well as confronted to a potential decline of their authority in 
multi-actor networks11. They have been confronted to permanent criticisms regarding their 
capacity to deliver technical assistance to countries and populations of the South. UN 
organizations are therefore particularly concerned with their external legitimacy, as they are 
challenged to survive by demonstrating their ability to change. They have to give evidence 
that they have a capacity to change. They are prompted to demonstrate accountability, as well 
as to adapt their policy objectives and their operating procedures to emerging standards 
emanating from their environment. UN organizations are challenged to deliver with greater 
efficiency, through two main directions: the reform of their internal management and the 
better coordination of the whole UN system. The pressure on the UN system was particularly 
high in the 2000s, as state representatives from OECD countries drove explicit claims for 
management reform within multilateral organizations. The following part pays particular 
attention to the transactional exchanges through which the main donors of UNAIDS 
addressed the need to disseminate new management solutions within the Programme.  
UN system-wide reform, donor pressure and the diffusion of new management standards  
The acceleration of UN system-wide reform is a key factor that has stimulated efforts to 
improve UNAIDS governance. In the early 2000s, a series of high-level meetings on 
development assistance12 urged the many UN specialized agencies, funds, and programmes to 
improve their internal management. These meetings took place in a context of global 
                                                
11 The degree of exposure of multilateral agencies to external pressure may vary from one organization to the 
other (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Boswell 2008). 
12 The Monterrey Conference (2002), the Rome Forum on Harmonization (2003), the Marrakech Round Table 
on Results-Based Management (2004), the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the 2005 UN World 
Summit, and, more recently, the Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2008). 
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diffusion of new public management rules and instruments, attesting to the globalization of 
the neoliberal paradigm already in place in the early 1990s (Common 1998; Suleiman and 
Waterbury 1990). They resulted in the adoption of resolutions enjoining international 
organizations to pool resources, undertake joint programming, build knowledge networks, 
coordinate the provision of technical support, simplify legal procedures, evaluate their results 
on a regular basis, and align their programmes with government development plans. The 
pressures for organizational restructuring became very high during Kofi Annan’s tenure as 
UN Secretary-General. In 1997 and again in 2002, the Secretariat General launched a vast 
series of administration reforms that assigned UN agencies considerable obligations to reform 
their management rules and standard procedures, and to connect and combine their activities. 
The commitment to reform has been so high on the agenda of the Secretariat General and 
various UN bodies that it gives substance to the idea that “reforming the organization” has 
become not only an objective of the UN but a modus operandi that structures all its activities 
at every stage.  
The call for UN system-wide reform created a momentum that immediately affected UN 
activities on AIDS in the early-2000s. The pressure to reform the UN system increased with 
various political commitments that raised expectations among donors and partners of the UN, 
and created the conditions for reforming the management of UNAIDS13. These commitments 
were followed by an independent five-year evaluation of UNAIDS (2002), a Consultation 
meeting on harmonization of AIDS international funding (2004), as well as a 2005 survey on 
UNAIDS conducted by a network of 16 donors (MOPAN), which fueled criticisms regarding 
the weaknesses of the Joint UN Programme and the lack of accountability of the Cosponsors. 
They also revealed how little progress had been made by UNAIDS since its creation in 1996. 
As in many other fields of development, they addressed the major flaws, obstacles, and other 
impediments to an integrated and efficient Programme: lack of responsiveness in the 
provision of technical assistance in the field; policy gaps; fragmentation of programmes; 
inefficient interagency coordination; duplication of efforts; and competition among agencies 
in fund raising and in country-level implementation. Moreover, it was observed that separate 
UN agendas, lack of joint mechanisms, and actions in parallel, resulted in burdening the 
national administrations of developing countries. In this context, the key donors of UNAIDS 
placed the Programme under scrutiny.  
The convergence of criticisms regarding UNAIDS revealed contradictory strategies from 
donor states: the US government found a justification to give priority to its major bilateral 
initiative against AIDS (the PEPFAR initiative); the French government could justify pushing 
the Global Fund as an innovative mechanism, as well as a state-controlled programme such as 
UNITAID, rather than UNAIDS; by contrast, the UK, Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands and Germany found a way to call for a more efficient UN mechanism that would 
be effectively accountable to their coming financial contributions. Despite promoting 
different strategies, all bilateral donors had interest in pushing the UNAIDS reform.  
In this context, the British government hosted in 2005 a high-level Global Task Team (known 
as the “GTT”) to promote noticeable and swift improvements in AIDS coordination among 
multilateral institutions and international donors. Convened just one week after the adoption 
of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the GTT made recommendations for 
improving the institutional architecture of the response to AIDS. It urged the Cosponsors and 
the Secretariat to move towards a comprehensive response demonstrating their capacity to 
coordinate their many AIDS plans through the Joint Programme. It called for a reform of their 
                                                
13 The UN “Millennium Declaration” (2000) or the UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS (2001). 
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management rules with tangible results that could be assessed and measured. The UN General 
Assembly subsequently endorsed its recommendations during the 2005 World Summit.  
The external pressure to reform UNAIDS created the conditions of reform. Nevertheless they 
would not have come through without the active support of bureaucratic actors within the UN 
system. As major researches on administration reforms at national level show, the political 
decisions are not sufficient to explain why administration reforms are engaged. Various 
groups of actors based within the bureaucratic system (e.g. administrative units, high-level 
bureaucrats, professions, unions) or situated in the near environment of bureaucracies (policy 
partners, experts and consultants, pressure groups) may weigh on the reform process (James 
2003; Bezes 2009). They constitute a conglomerate of distinct rationalities and interests. They 
follow specific logic of action and may build individual or collective strategies regarding the 
reform. They also act according to their own culture, their knowledge and their institutional 
routines. Their intervention may result in accelerating, reinterpreting or impeding 
organizational reforms.  
Rather than considering the adaptation of the UN Programme to external pressure as a 
mechanical and diffuse process, the following development pays attention to transactional 
games bringing together some actors who have been drivers for reform. It focuses particularly 
on bureaucratic actors who participated in channeling the external demands within the 
UNAIDS system and were keen to promote organizational reform to strengthen their authority 
within the UN administration.  
Bureaucratic entrepreneurs and management reforms  
This section identifies the major steps through which the UNAIDS system has engaged in 
efforts to set up performance-based management instruments, to harmonize policy priorities, 
and to strengthen interorganizational coordination. It argues that the active support of some 
UN agencies who have a common interest in shifting institutional arrangements inside the 
UNAIDS system may explain the swift incorporation of the donors’ demands within a reform 
process. It draws particular attention to the increasing capacity of the UNAIDS Secretariat to 
take part in the design and implementation of new management standards and coordination 
rules within the Programme.  
Bureaucratic alliances and the rise of a new configuration of actors  
A focus on organizational interests within the UNAIDS system may help understand why 
some of the Cosponsors may have supported strategies of managerial change. From the early 
years, as a coordinating body in charge of overcoming organizational compartmentalization 
within UNAIDS, the Secretariat has always been a supporter of policy convergence, 
interagency coordination and standardization of rules. Nevertheless, it remained confined in a 
restricted role during the first decade of the Programme. Its low bureaucratic authority 
resulting from its position of secretariat, from a lack of support from member states and from a 
lack of expert capacities, did not provide any chance for the Secretariat to drive Cosponsors 
towards a more integrated system. For years, Cosponsors’ executive directors considered the 
Secretariat’s executive director as a facilitator, rather than a counterpart.  
The capacity of the Secretariat to channel the donors’ claims for managerial reforms increased 
in the mid-2000s, as divisions between Cosponsors became higher. The Secretariat took 
advantage of the divisions between UN agencies to play a greater role in the Programme. It 
used the temporary support provided by some Cosponsors to overcome the resistance of other 
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Cosponsors to move towards a coordinated system. Between 1999 and 2004, four new 
members joined the Programme (UNODC, ILO, WFP, UNHCR), in addition to the six 
“founding” Cosponsors (UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, WHO, World Bank). This new 
institutional configuration appeared to be favorable to the Secretariat’s influence within the 
Programme. One reason is the greater dependency of the four newcomers on the facilitation 
role of the Secretariat, which could help them to capture “backstage information”, informal 
rules and bureaucratic routines of UNAIDS, with a greater chance to challenge the influence 
of the founding Cosponsors. Another reason is the early support of these newcomers to the 
introduction of new management standards that could change the criteria of resource allocation 
on their advantage. In particular, the introduction of performance-based standards was an 
unparalleled opportunity for newcomers to challenge the existing institutional rules based on 
low mutual control and unclear fund-sharing principles. Such a shift was also supported by 
three founding Cosponsors (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF), mainly because of their institutional 
commitment to a wider interagency mechanism, the UN Development Group (UNDG), aiming 
at designing guidance on UN reform at country-level14. None of these agencies could have 
found itself in a schizophrenic situation by challenging a shift towards new management rules 
in UNAIDS while they were supporting similar reform through UNDG. 
In this new institutional configuration of the mid-2000s, the capacity of the Secretariat to 
build cooperative games with the Cosponsors whose rationality and interests were open to a 
change in the governance of UNAIDS constituted a major step in its ability to instill reform 
proposals within the Programme. The commitment of WFP was particularly high, as it 
contributed, together with the Secretariat, to raise pressure on all UNAIDS members in 2005 
by convincing the steering committee of Cosponsors to command an “external consultant 
review” to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG). The BCG, one of the most prominent global 
management consulting firm, thus played a role in the dissemination of new ideas and norms 
throughout the Programme, by calling for a greater clarification of Cosponsors’ roles and a 
better accountability system. At the same time, following its mandate in resource mobilization, 
the Secretariat led bilateral consultations with national delegations and governmental agencies 
representing the “likeminded donors” of UNAIDS. As these consultations were occasions for 
donors from Nordic countries and the UK to set conditions in favor of reforming the 
Programme in the context of the GTT resolution, they gave to the Secretariat an additional 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the Cosponsors to push efforts towards new management standards within 
UNAIDS. They also gave the Secretariat a capacity to make a good case for demonstrating its 
key role in resource mobilization, at a time when some donors of UNAIDS were reorientating 
their funding strategies outside the UN system. 
In the mid-2000s, the balance of power among UNAIDS members imperceptibly shifted from 
a polyarchic system based on voluntary initiatives of Cosponsors, a certain level of 
bureaucratic autonomy vis-à-vis member states, and a Secretariat with limited authority, to 
greater interdependencies among agencies, higher dependency on donors’ strategies, and a 
consolidation of the Secretariat’s brokering capacities. With regard to reform incentives, this 
article argues that such a shift cannot be explained only as the result of the donors’ pressure 
along with UN system-wide reform, but also went with attempts of the Secretariat to build 
alliances with the new Cosponsors and to embark some of the founding agencies on a strategy 
of organizational change, while also using its position in resource mobilization to 
reappropriate donors’ claims, and to be given a key role in the design of management reform. 
In such a context, some Cosponsors like WHO or the World Bank, which were reluctant to 
                                                
14 The UNDG was created in 1997 to improve effectiveness of operational development agencies. The three UN 
agencies are, together with WFP, chairing the Executive Committee of UNDG, with the mandate of designing 
system-wide guidance to coordinate, harmonize and align UN development programmes at the country-level 
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acknowledge the driving role of the Secretariat in the early 2000s, had no longer strong 
argument to object to strengthened coordination rules. The following development describes 
the entrepreneurial role of the Secretariat within the Joint Programme, and particularly its 
contribution to the institutionalization of new policy and management standards in the years 
2005-2008.  
The UNAIDS Secretariat as a reform entrepreneur  
The Secretariat15 has become a key policy broker in the new institutional configuration that 
took shape within UNAIDS after 2005, despite a limited mandate and low resources. Not only 
was it empowered by the principals of UNAIDS to coordinate the setting of reform 
objectives, it has taken advantage of the lack of cohesion among Cosponsors to gradually 
broaden its influence as a coordinator of the Programme. It participated in the UNAIDS 
governance reform in four main areas: dissemination of management standards, policy 
harmonization, clarification of agencies’ policy jurisdictions, and interagency coordination.  
First, the GTT recommendations in 2005 constituted a window of opportunity for the 
Secretariat’s executive team to introduce NPM-inspired principles and instruments in the 
management of the Programme. The first shift took place in 2005 during a closed-door 
session of a meeting that brought together the UNAIDS “Global coordinators” (Cosponsors’ 
heads of AIDS programmes). The objective was to share out the 2006-2007 UNAIDS budget 
among the ten Cosponsors. Up until then, the distribution had been based on previous years’ 
decisions, not on a performance review. At this meeting, participants adopted informal criteria 
to assess the quality and scope of each Cosponsor’s AIDS programme, and then voted by 
secret ballot for a sharing out of the funds. The meeting was an authentic psychodrama. For 
the first time, UNAIDS funds were allocated according to the mutual assessment of 
Cosponsors’ strategies and results. This new procedure was a first step towards performance-
based standards. 
The Secretariat’s department of Financial Management and Accountability dedicated the next 
two years to the elaboration of new standards regarding budget and finance. It held several 
consultation meetings with Cosponsors to come up with measurable policy objectives that 
could be monitored and assessed through performance indicators and benchmarks. It also 
contributed to the dissemination of new regulations covering budget management, accounting 
and contracting procedures, using a results-based management (RBM) approach. In particular, 
it contributed to the adoption of control procedures aimed at reinforcing the transparency of 
budget appropriations, to the setting of tracking methods to assess the use of funds, and to the 
construction the relevant indicators needed to measure the impact of Cosponsors’ 
programmes. In 2007, such a multi-agency results-based budget was unique within the UN 
system.  
Since 2006-2007, the Cosponsors have agreed to shift towards new management standards. 
Several agencies have been investing in monitoring and evaluation capabilities. They have 
strengthened oversight mechanisms. They have created procedures to integrate findings into 
strategic planning cycles. They have set new quantified indicators to make their field offices 
accountable for policy results on the ground. The objective of this in-depth transformation is 
to avoid the situation that prevailed during the first decade of UNAIDS: an absence of formal 
                                                
15 Reform entrepreneurs may be defined as a kind of policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1984) who promotes 
innovations in organizational systems (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness and Rovik, 2007; Le Lidec and Bezes 
2010). When this paper refers to “the Secretariat” as a reform entrepreneur, it refers to the top and senior 
managers of this administration (executive head, team leaders, and high-profile technical staff).  
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rules for the allocation of the UNAIDS budget; a lack of tracking methods, results-based 
indicators, and independent oversight procedures regarding the use of the funds; and a general 
trend among the Cosponsors to spend financial resources on scattered and non-coordinated 
small-scale projects.  
Second, the Secretariat also gave major support to policy convergence through the 
consolidation of a multisectoral policy framework aiming at streamlining the Cosponsors’ 
AIDS strategies under one UNAIDS Programme. At the country level, efforts for UN 
harmonization were undertaken through a global campaign promoting coordination of 
national AIDS responses (called the “Three Ones”), as well as through the UN system-wide 
reform driven by the UN Development Group. At the global level, the Secretariat used the 
UNAIDS budget as a technical leverage to drive Cosponsors towards an agreement on joint 
policy objectives. The 2006-2007 UNAIDS budget was the first budget to be built on a result-
based structure. The Secretariat reduced the number of “key results” associated with the 
Cosponsors’ AIDS strategies by 90 %, shifting from 487 in 2004-05 to 46 in 2006-07. In 
parallel, at the request of the UN General Assembly it organized consultation meetings at 
country and regional levels to build a joint policy framework called “Towards Universal 
Access,” which were endorsed by all UNAIDS partners and is now conceived as worldwide 
guidance for internationally recognized policy standards.  
The appropriation of this programmatic shift by Cosponsors has been uneven. On the one 
hand, Cosponsors have paid particular attention to these joint objectives when it came to 
providing the UNAIDS governing board and donors with data and information in progress 
reports. They have had to align their performance indicators to these objectives. Greater effort 
and resources have been dedicated to conducting various assessments, reviews, and 
evaluation of UNAIDS efforts in selected areas of activities. On the other hand, Cosponsors 
continue to base their global strategies on their own priorities. Their programmes on AIDS 
scarcely reflect UNAIDS as a family and do not focus on the expected “key results.”  
Third, policy harmonization may appear irrelevant without a clear identification of the UN 
agencies’ respective jurisdictions with regard to the epidemic. In 2005, the GTT enjoined the 
Cosponsors to make substantial efforts to clarify their mandates, in order to put an end to 
competition among agencies, programmatic fragmentation, policy overlaps and gaps, and lack 
of accountability. The Secretariat seized these recommendations and conducted the 
elaboration of a “UNAIDS Division of Labor”, which assigned each Cosponsor to specific 
policy areas, depending on their mandate and their “comparative advantage” in the field. For 
instance, UNICEF is responsible for the support of orphans and vulnerable children, 
UNESCO for HIV prevention in educational institutions, UNFPA for prevention among key 
populations, and UNHCR for all activity related to refugees and internally displaced people.  
Four, coordination of UN bureaucracies remains one of the primary objectives of UNAIDS. 
From coordination depends the capacity of the UN system to integrate the various UN 
agencies’ sectoral approaches into a coherent policy framework. It is also crucial in the 
provision of technical assistance to support governments and national stakeholders in 
implementing AIDS responses in various fields (e.g. public health, education, finance, 
agriculture). It is essential for building results-focused and cost-effective strategies against the 
epidemic. With the support of Cosponsors having large operational capacities on the ground 
(WHO, UNDP and UNICEF), the Secretariat participated in the setting of new vertical 
mechanisms to channel UN assistance to a variety of beneficiaries (national administrations, 
civil society organizations, the private sector, and sometimes bilateral organizations and other 
UN agencies). The Secretariat also participated in the setting new support desks (“Technical 
Support Facilities”) in nearly 60 countries, tasked with helping identify and contact the 
relevant experts who can assist national authorities and stakeholders in AIDS responses. In 
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2006, it also established a permanent forum (“the Global Implementation Support Team”) 
bringing together a limited number of UN agencies, funding organizations, bilateral donors, 
and NGOs to build rapid and coordinated technical responses to requests from governments.  
As stated by Le Lidec and Bezes (2011), the activity of reform entrepreneurs within public 
administrations should not be viewed as a “heroic activity.” It always takes place in systems 
of actors that generate both resistance and incentives to bureaucratic change. Therefore, the 
Secretariat’s participation in the UNAIDS reform policy cannot be dissociated from the 
configuration of Cosponsors, donors and member states, and other actors (e.g. members of the 
GTT, the Boston Consulting Group), in a context of global AIDS governance characterized 
by a greater exposure of international organizations to their environment. Nevertheless, this 
article suggests that the Secretariat also gained bureaucratic authority by promoting the 
reform, along the four criteria identified by Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 20): rational-legal 
(ability to make general, impersonal rules that order and classify the world), delegated (ability 
to represent the will of member states), moral (ability to serve the interests of the community 
and to defend universal values), and expert (ability to deploy specialized and technical 
knowledge). 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the UNAIDS Programme offers insights into understanding the organizational 
processes that go with management reforms in multilateral agencies. In particular, it shows 
that reforms are implemented through interactions driven by both coercion and opportunities.  
The UNAIDS case demonstrates that UN agencies are not likely to enter into a process of 
management reform by themselves, despite they participate in an sui generis inter-
organizational system tailor-made to overcome recurring governance challenges faced by 
international bureaucracies – such as institutional complexity, coordination problems, 
competing policy agendas, and overlapping activities. As most other international 
organizations, they are bureaucratic entities, protecting their autonomy and focusing on their 
own expansion. They tend to reproduce organizational patterns, practices and routines, which 
were institutionalized during past activities. They do not systematically import norms and 
prescriptions from their environment. By contrast, external pressure – which can be diffuse 
(circulation of ideas) or concentrate (direct interventions from principals and partners) – may 
contribute to induce organizational change and policy shifts. In the UNAIDS case, the choice 
to initiate management reforms results to a large extent from the growing pressure from the 
donor community, the diffusion of neomanagerial norms throughout international 
organizations, and structural change in the global AIDS governance.   
Nevertheless, this article makes a connection between the disposition of UNAIDS actors to 
respond to external pressures and entrepreneurial activities within the Programme. It 
demonstrate that such pressures are likely to result in tangible organizational reforms only if 
they are appropriated and supported by actors who anticipate increased influence and control 
over their partners once reforms are implemented. The reforming process depends on the 
distribution of power among UNAIDS members and the interests of each member to 
strategically embark in the reform. As suggested in the article, it is necessary to explore the 
configuration of actors, their interests and intentions, when understanding the reasons why 
some of them decided to reappropriate the call for reform, to import and adapt principals’ 
demands into a programmatic strategy, and to seek various supports (donors, other UN 
entities, a consulting firm) to sustain and legitimate the design of a policy response. This 
article argues that the reform of UNAIDS was associated with the aspiration of some its 
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members to strengthen their authority and to challenge the initial distribution of resources 
within the Programme. It shows that the members with lower capacity, such as “new” 
Cosponsors or the Secretariat, had the strongest interest in promoting better efficiency and 
accountability of UNAIDS, through neomanagerial instruments, policy harmonization and 
coordination efforts. In particular, as a low-resource actor in the Programme, the Secretariat 
had a strong interest in pushing the reform agenda. It seized the external pressure as a window 
of opportunity to promote organizational change and, by doing so, to expand its coordinating 
role. However, it has also encountered some strong criticisms regarding the risk of self-
expansion and bureaucratization, as it may shift in the long term from the situation of a 
restricted coordination body to a new bureaucratic structure16. 
Lastly, in the 2000s the growing attention to governance challenges in the AIDS response has 
had an impact on the agenda of UNAIDS organizations. As many multilateral organizations, 
the Secretariat and the Cosponsors have turned their primary attention to organizational 
challenges. This shift may be seen as a step forward, since it has helped UN agencies to move 
away from years of mismanagement, competition, and fragmentation of agency plans. 
Nevertheless, bureaucratic reform has become an end in itself: the focus on governance issues 
may well result in a reallocation of resources towards improving UN mechanisms rather than 
focusing on the assistance needed by affected populations at the grass-root level. It can thus 
encourage UN professionals working on AIDS to concentrate primarily on organizational 
processes instead of paying greater attention to policy development. Gathering statistics that 
meet requirements set by new indicators and benchmarks, setting new coordinating 
mechanisms or adapting standard operating rules at all levels, may partly satisfy donors and 
other financial partners. But it takes a lot of energy, time, and money, which may divert the 
attention of UN experts from the urgent challenges they ought to be taking up. As often 
demonstrated in the scientific literature on public organizations, actual bureaucratic change 
hardly reflects the intentions of the reformers. Any reform has hidden costs and unanticipated 
side-effects that should always be questioned. 
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